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 INFERENCES. 345 same thing, but the intuition of succession easily succeeds in accomplishing it. The argument is followed by conclusions and explana- tions based upon it; (i) Space is the form of the outer, time of the inner, sense. Through the outer sense external objects are given to us. and through the inner sense our own inner states. But since all representations, whether they have external things for their objects or not, belong in themselves, as mental determinations, to our inner state, time is the formal condition of all phenomena in general, directly of internal (psychical) phenomena, and, tTiereby, indirectly of external phenomena also. (2) The validity of the relations of space and time cognizable a priori is established for all objects of possible experience, but is limited to these. They are valid for all phenomena (for all things which at any time may be given to our senses), but only for these, not for things as they are in themselves. They have " empirical reality, but, at the same time, transcendental ideality." As external phenomena all things are beside one another in space, and all phe- nomena whatever are in time and of necessity under temporal relations ; in regard to all things which can occur in our experience, and in so far as they can occur, space and time are- objectively, therefore empirically, real. But they do not possess absolute reality (neither subsistent reality nor the reality of inherence) ; for if we abstract from ouTs^TTsuatis intuition both vanish, and, apart from the sub- ject i^N. B., the transcendental subject, concerning which more below), they are naught. It is only from man's point of view that we can speak of space, and of extended, move- able, changeable things ; for we can know nothing concern- ing the intuitions of other thinking beings, we have no means of discovering whether they are bound by the same conditions which limit our intuitions, and which for us are universally valid. (3) Nothing which is intuited in space is a thing in itself. What we call external objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, whose true correlative, the thing in itself, cannot be known by ever so deep penetration into the phenomenon ; such properties as belong to things in themselves can never be given to us