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 / 334 KANT. such judgments, which, at the same time, are ampliative and absolutely universal and necessary. , The first two sci- ences are pure mathematics and pure natural science, of which the former is protected against doubt concerning its legitimacy by its evident character, and the latter, by the constant possibility of verification in experience ; each, moreover, can point to the continuous course of its develop- ment. 1 All this is absent in the third science, metaphysics, as science of the suprasensible, and to its great disadvantage. Experiential verification is in the nature of things denied u to a presumptive knowledge of that which is beyond expe- rience ; it lacks evidence to such an extent that there is scarcely a principle to be found to which all metaphysicians assent, much less a metaphysical text-book to compare with Euclid ; there is so little continuous advance that it is rather true that the later comers are likely to overthrow all that their predecessors have taught. In metaphysics, therefore, which, it must be confessed, is actual as a natural tendency, the question is not, as in the other two sciences, concerning the grounds of its legitimacy, but concerning this legitimacy itself. Mathematics and pure physics form synthetic judgments a priori, and metaphysics does the same. But the principles of the two former are unchal- lenged, while those of the third are not. In the former case the subject for investigation is, Whence this authority? in the latter case. Is she thus authorized? Thus the main question, How are synthetic judgments <z /r^Vr? possible ? divides into the subordinate questions, How is pure mathematics possible? How is pure natural science possible, and, How is metaphysics (in two senses: metaphysics in general, and metaphysics as science) pos- sible ? The Transcendental Esthetic (the critique of sensi- bility or the faculty of intuition) answers the first of these questions ; the Transcendental Analytic (the critique of the understanding), the second ; and the T ranscendental Dia - lectic (the critique of " reason " in the narrower sense) and the Transcendental Doctrine of Method {Methodenlehre), the third. The Analytic and the Dialectic are the two parts of the Transcendental " Logic " (critique of the faculty of thought), which, together with the ^Esthetic, forms the