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 KANT'S DEVELOPMENT. 323 detailed statement concerning the how of this self-knowl- edge, concerning the organ of the critical philosophy. But Kant never gave one, and the omission subsequently led to a sharp debate concerning the character and method of the Critique of Reason. On this point, if we may so express it, Kant remained a dogmatist. Kant felt himself to be the finisher of skepticism ; but this was chiefly because he had received the strongest impulse to the development of his critique of knowledge from Hume's inquiries concerning causation. Brought up in the dogmatic rationalism of the Wolffian school, to which he remained true for a considerable period as a teacher and writer (till about 1760), although at the same time he was inquiring with an independent spirit, Kant was gradually won over through the influence of the English philosophy to the side of empirical skepticism. Then — as the result, no doubt, of reading the Nouveaux Essais of Leibnitz, published in 1765 — he returned to rationalistic principles, until finally, after a renewal of empirical influences,* he took the position crystallized in the Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, which, however, experienced still other, though less considerable, changes in the sequel, just as in itself it shows the traces of previous transformations. It would be a most interesting task to trace in the writ- ings which belong to Kant's pre-critical period the growth and development of the fundamental critical positions. Here, however, we can only mention in passing the sub- jects of his reflection and some of the most striking antici- pations and beginnings of his epoch-making position. Even his maiden work, Thoughts on the True Estimation of Vis Viva, 1747, betokens the mediating nature of its author. In this it is argued that when men of profound and pene- trating minds maintain exactly opposite opinions, attention must be chiefly directed to some intermediate principle to a certain degree compatible with the correctness of both parties. The question under discussion was whether I., 1881, pp. 48-49. This is a work marked by acuteness, great industry, and »n objective point of view which meritsrespect. The second volume, which treats of the Transcendental y^sthetic, appeared in 1 892.
 * Cf. H. Vaihinger's Kommentar zu /Cants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, rol.