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 fVOLFF. 297 reduction of the philosophy of Leibnitz to a systematic form, by which he secured a dissemination for it which otherwise it would scarcely have obtained. But he did not possess sufficient originality to contribute anything remarkable of his own, and it showed little self-knowledge when he became indignant at the designation Leibnitzio- Wolffian philosophy, which was first used by his pupil, Bilfinger. The alterations which he made in the doc- trines of Leibnitz are far from being improvements, and the parts which he rejected are just the most characteristic and thoughtful of all. Such at least is the opinion of thinkers to-day, though this mutilation and leveling down of the most daring of Leibnitz's hypotheses was perhaps entirely advantageous for Wolff's impression on his contemporaries; what appeared questionable to him would no doubt have repelled them also. Leibnitz's two leading ideas, the theory of monads and the pre-established harmony, were most of all affected by this process of toning down. Wolff weakens the former by attributing a representative power only to actual souls, which are capable of con- sciousness, although he holds that bodies are com- pounded of simple beings and that the latter are endowed with (a not further defined) force. He limits the applica- tion of the pre-established harmony to the relation of body and soul, which to Leibnitz was only a case especially favorable for the illustration of the hypothesis. By such trifling the real meaning of both these ideas is sacrificed and their bloom rubbed off. — While depth is lacking in Wolff's thinking, he is remarkable for his power of sys- tematization, his persevering diligence, and his logical earnestness, so that the praise bestowed on him by Kant, that he was the author of the spirit of thoroughness in Ger- many, was well deserved. He, too, finds the end of philos- ophy in the enlightenment of the understanding, the improvement of the heart, and, ultimately, in the promo- tion of the; happiness of mankind. But while Thomasius demanded as a condition of such universal intelligibility and usefulness that, discarding the scholastic garb, philoso- phy should appear in the form of easy ratiocination, Wolff, on the other hand, regards methodical procedure and