Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/294

 aj2 LEIBNITZ. . make an impression on us, if only a small one, since other- wise their total — as a sum of mere nothings — could not be heard. The sensation which the motion of the single wave causes is a weak, confused, unconscious, infinitesimal per- ception {petite, insensible perception), which must be com- bined with many similar minute sensations in order to become strong and distinct, or to rise above the threshold of consciousness. The sound of the single wave is felt, but not distinguished, is perceived, but not apperceived. These obscure states of unconscious representation, which are present in the mind of man along with states of clear consciousness, make up, in the lowest grade of existence,, 'the whole life of the monad. There are beings which never rise above the condition of deep sleep or stupor. In conformity with this more inclusive meaning, percep- tion is defined as the representation of the external in the internal, of multiplicity in unity {representatio viultititdinis in unitate). The representing being, without prejudice to its simplicity, bears in itself a multitude of relations to external things. What now is the manifold, which is expressed, perceived, or represented, in the unit, the monad? It is the whole world. Every monad represents all others in itself, is a concentrated all, the universe in miniature. Each individual contains an infinity in itself ! {substantia infinitas actiones simiil exercei), and a supreme ' intelligence, for which every obscure idea would at once become distinct, would be able to read in a single monad the whole universe and its history — all that is, has been, or will be ; for the past has left its traces behind it, and the future will bring nothing not founded in the present : the monad is freighted with the past and bears the future in its bosom. Every monad is thus a mirror of the universe, * strictly speaking there is no content for the representation of the monads, ahhough he appears to offer them the richest of all contents, the whole world. The " All " which he makes them represent is itself nothing but a sum of beings, also representative. The objects of representation are merely representing sub- jects; the monad A represents the monads from B to Z, while these in turn do nothing more than represent one another. The monad mirrors mirrors — where is the thing that is mirrored? The essence of substance consists in being related to others, which themselves are only points of relation ; amid mere relativities we never reach a real. That which prevented Leibnitz himself from
 * The objection has been made against Leibnitz, and not without reason, that