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 METAPHYSICS: THE MONADS. 271 over into the realm of the immaterial and come to the conclusion that bodies are composed of immaterial con- stituents. Physical points, the atoms, are physical, but not points ; mathematical points are indivisible, but not real ; metaphysical or substantial points, the incorporeal, soul- like units, alone combine in themselves indivisibility and reality — the monads are the true atoms. Together with indivisibility they possess immortality ; as it is impossible for them to arise and perish through the combination and sepa- ration of parts, they cannot come into being or pass out of it in any natural way whatever, but only by creation or annihilation. Their non-spatial or punctual character implies the impossibility of all external influence, the monad develops its states from its own inner nature, has need of no other thing, is sufficient unto itself, and therefore deserves the Aristotelian name, entelechy. Thus two lines of thought combine in the concept of the monad. Gratefully recognizing the suggestions from both sides, Leibnitz called Cartesianism the antechamber of the j true philosophy, and atomism the preparation for the theory 1 of monads. From the first it followed that the substances were self-acting forces; from the second, that they were immaterial units. Through the combination of both de- terminations we gain information concerning the kind of force or activity which constitutes the being of the monad : the monads are representative forces. There is nothing truly real in the world save the monads and their repre- sentations [ideas, perceptions]. In discussing the representation in which the being and activity of the monads consist, we must not think directly of the conscious activity of the human soul. Representa- tion has in Leibnitz a wider meaning than that usually associated with the word. The distinction, which has become of the first importance for psychology, between mere representation and conscious representation, or ', between perception and apperception, may be best explained 1 by the example of the sound of the waves. The roar which we perceive in the vicinity of the sea-beach is composed of the numerous sounds of the single waves. Each single sound is of itself too small to be heard ; nevertheless it must