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 214 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 4. Theory of Knowledge. (a) Berkeley. — George Berkeley, a native of Ireland, Bishop of Cloyne (1685-1753 ; A71 Essay toward a New The- ory of Vision, 1709; A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710 ; Three Dialogues betweeti Hylas and Philonous, 171 3; Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, 1732, against the freethinkers ; Works, 1784. Fraser's edi- » tion of the Collected Works appeared in 1871, in four vol- umes),* is related to Locke as Spinoza to Descartes. He notices blemishes and contradictions allowed by his prede- cessor to remain, and, recognizing that the difficulty is not to be remedied by minor corrections and artificial hypothe- ses, goes back to the fundamental principles, takes these more earnestly than their author, and, by carrying them out more strictly, arrives at a new view of the world. The points in Locke's doctrines which invited a further ad- vance were the following : Locke proclaims t hat our knowl- edge extendsjio_iurjU[ieLlha|^^ con- sisfs^n the ap;ref;ment nf id eas amon p r themselve s, not in the a g^^reemeat o Lddeas- ^th thing s. But this principle had scarcely been announced before it was violated. In spite of h is limita ljon^f k nowledge to ideas. Locke maintains that we know (if not the inner constitution, "^yet) t he qua lities and po wers of things without us, and have a " sensitive " certaint y of their existe nce. Against this, it is to be said that there are no primary qualities, that is, qualities which exist without as well as within us. Extension, motion, solidity, which are cited as such, are just as purely subjective states in us as color, heat, and sweetness. Impenetrability is nothing more than the feeling of resistance, an idea, there- fore, which self-evidently can be nowhere else than in the mind experiencing it. Extension, size, distance, and motion are not even sensations (we see colors only, not quantitative determinations), but relations which we in thinking add to the sense-qualities (secondary qualities), and which we are not able to represent apart from them ; their Selections from Berkeley, 4th ed., 189I ; and Krauth's edition of the Princip'et. 1874, with notes from several sources, especially those translated from Uebe^ weg. — Tr.
 * Cf. also Fraser's Berkeley (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics) 1881 ; Fraser's