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 »76 LOCKE. rational criticism assures him an honorable place in the history of English deism. He enriched the philosoph) of religion by two treatises of his own : The Reasonabltiiess of Christianity, 1695, and three Letters on Tolerance, 1689-1692. The former transfers the center of gravity of the Chris- tian religion from history to the doctrine of redemption ; the Letters demand religious freedom, mutual tolerance among the different sects, and the separation of Church and State. Those sects alone are to receive no tolerance which themselves exercise none, and which endanger the well- being of society ; together with atheists, who are incapable of taking oaths. In other respects it is the duty of the state to protect all confessions and to favor none. (b) Practical Philosophy. — Locke contributed to practical philosophy important suggestions concerning freedom, morality, politics, and education. Freedom is the "power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to "actions (thoughts and motions). It is not destroyed by the fact that the will is always moved by desire, more exactly, by uneasiness under present circumstances, .and that the deci- sion is determined by the judgment of the understanding. Although the result of examination is itself dependent on the unalterable relations of ideas, it is still in our power to decide whether we will consider at all, and what ideas we will take into consideration. Not the thought, not the deter- mination of the will, is free, but the person, the mind ; this has the power to suspend the prosecution of desire, and by its judgment to determine the will, even in opposition to inclination. Four stages must, consequently, be distin- guished in the volitional process: desire or uneasiness; the deliberative combination of ideas; the judgment of the understanding; determination. Freedom has its place at the beginning of the second stage : it is open to me to decide whether to proceed at all to consideration and final judgment concerning a proposed action ; thus to prevent desire from directly issuing in movements; and, according to the result of my examination, perhaps, to substitute for the act originally desired an opposite one. Without freedom, moral judgment and responsibility would be im- possible. The above appears to us to represent the essence