Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/167

 MALEBRANCHE. MS tion in four volumes, prepared by J. Simon, in 1871. His chief work, On the Search for Truth (new edition by F. Bouillier, 1880), appeared in 1675, and was followed by the Treatise on Ethics (new edition by H. Joly, 1882) and the Christian and Metaphysical Meditations in 1684, the Dis- cussions on Metaphysics and on Religion in 1688, and various polemic treatises. The best known among the doctrines of Malebranche is the principle that we see all things in God {que nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu. — Recherche, iii. 2, 6). What does this mean, and how is it established? It is in- tended as an answer to the question, How is it possible for the mind to cognize the body if, as Descartes has shown, mind and body are two fundamentally distinct and recipro- cally independent substances ? The seeker after truth must first understand the sources of error. Of these there are two, or, more exactly, five — as many as there are faculties of the soul. Error may spring from either the cognitive or the appetitive faculty ; in the first case, either from sense-perception, the imagination, or the pure understanding, and, in the latter, from the in- clinations or the passions. The inclinations and the pas- sions do not reveal the nature of things, but only express how they affect us, of what value they are to us. Further still, the senses and the imagination only reproduce the impressions which things make on us as feeling subjects, express only what they are for us, not what they are in themselves. The senses have been given us simply for the preservation of our body, and so long as we expect nothing further from them than practical information concerning the (useful or hurtful) relation of things to our body, there is no reason for mistrusting them, — here we are not deceived by sensation, but at most by the overhasty judgment of the will. " Consider the senses as false witnesses in regard to the truth, but as trustworthy counselors in relation to the interests of life ! " — Sensation and imagination belong to the soul in virtue of its union with the body ; apart from this it is pure spirit. The essence of the soul is thought, for this function is the only one which cannot be ab- stracted from it without destroying it. Hence there can be no moment in the life of the soul when it ceases to