Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/153

 SPINOZA: SUBSTANCE, ATTRIBUTES, MODES. 131 This is the conception of infinite modes. As such are cited, fades totius mundi, motus et quies, intellectus absolute infin- itus. Kuno Fischer's interpretation of this difficult con- ception may be accepted. It denotes, according to him, the connected sum of the modes, the itself non-finite sum total of the finite — the universe meaning the totality of individ- ual things in general (without reference to their nature as extended or cogitative); rest and motion, the totality of material being; the absolutely infinite understanding, the totality of spiritual being or the ideas. Individual spirits together constitute, as it were, the infinite intellect ; our mind is a part of the divine understanding, yet not in such a sense that the whole consists of the parts, but that the part exists only through the whole. When we say, the/ human mind perceives this or that, it is equivalent to say-| ing that God — not in so far as he is infinite, but as he ex- presses himself in this human mind and constitutes it* essence — has this or that idea {. prop. 11, corolL). The discussion of these three fundamental concepts ex' hausts all the chief points in Spinoza's doctrine of God, Passing over his doctrine of body (II. between /r^/. 13 andV prop. 14) we turn at once to his discussion of mind and man. (b) Anthropology: Cognition and the Passions — Each thing is at once (cf. p. 129) mind and body, representation and that which is represented, idea and ideate (object). Body and soul are the same being, only considered under dif- erent attributes. The human mind is the idea of the human ;, body; it cognizes itself in perceiving the affections of its body ; it represents all that takes place in the body, though not all adequately. As man's body is composed of very many bodies, so his soul is composed of very many ideas. To judge of the relation of the human mind to the mind of lower beings, we must consider the superiority of man's body to other bodies ; the more complex a body is, and the greater the variety of the affections of which it is capable, the better and more adapted for adequate cognition, the accompanying mind. — A result of the identity of soul and body is that the acts of our will are not free {Epist. 62) : they are, in fact, deter- minations of our body, only considered under the attribute of thought, and no more free than this from the constraint