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 120 DEVELOPMENT OF CARTEHIANISM matical method ; second, the concept of substance, together with the dualism of extension and thought ; finally, the fun- damental mechanical position, together with the impossi- bility of interaction between matter and spirit, held in common with the occasionalists, but reached independently of them. Whatever new elements are added {e. g., the transformation of the Deity from a mere aid to knowledge into its most important, nay, its only object ; as, also, the enthusiastic, directly mystical devotion to the all-embracing world-ground) are of an essentially emotional nature, and to be referred less to historical influences than to the indi- viduality of the thinker. The divergences from his pre- decessors, however, especially the extension of mechanism to mental phenomena and the denial of the freedom of the will, inseparable from this, result simply from the more con- sistent application of Cartesian principles. Spinoza is not an inventive, impulsive spirit, like Descartes and Leibnitz, but a systematic one; his strength does not lie in brilliant inspirations, but in the power of resolutely thinking a thing tiirough ; not in flashes of thought, but in strictly closed circles of thought. He develops, but with genius, and to the end. Nevertheless this consecutiveness of Spinoza, the praises of which have been unceasingly sung by genera- tions since his day, has its limits. It holds for the un- wavering development of certain principles derived from Descartes, but not with equal strictness for the inter- connection of the several lines of thought followed out separately. His very custom of developing a principle straight on to its ultimate consequences, without regard to the needs of the heart or to logical demands from other directions, make it impossible for the results of the various lines of thought to be themselves in harmony ; his vertical consistency prevents horizontal consistency. If the original tendencies come into conflict (the consciously held theoretical principles into conflict with one another, or with hidden aesthetic or moral principles), either one gains the victory over the other or both insist on their claims; thus we have inconsistencies in the one case, and contra- dictions in the other (examples of which have been shown by Volkelt in his maiden -w orV:, Patiiheismus und Individual-