Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/127

 MAN. 105 Accordingly six grades of mental function are to be distinguished : ( i 'nie_j;xtejrnaL,senses. (2) The natural appe tites. (3) The passio ns (which, together with the natural appetites, constitute the internal senses, and from which the mental emotions produced by the intellect are quite distinct). (4) The ima^n ation w [th_its,two ilivisions, passive memory and active phantasy. (5) TJie intellect or reasorf. (6)':TlTe will. These various stages or facul- ties are, however, not distinct parts of the soul, as in the old psychology, in opposition to which Descartes em- phatically defends the unity of the soul. It is one and the same psychical power that exercises the higher and the lower, the rational and the sensuous, the practical and the theoretical activities. Of the mental functions, whether representative images, perceptions, or volitions, a part are referred to body (to parts of our own body, often also to external objects), and produced by the body (by the animal spirits and, gener- ally, by the nerves as well), while the rest find both object and cause in the soul. Intermediate between the two classes stand those acts of the will which are caused by the soul, but which relate to the body, e. g., when I resolve to walk or leap; and, what is more important, the /^i-.rz'^wi-, which relate to the soul itself, but which are called forth, sas- tained, and intensified by certain motions of the animal spirits. Since only those beings which consist of a body as well as a soul are capable of the passions, these are specifi- cally human phenomena. These affections, though very numerous, may be reduced to a few simple or primary ones, of which the rest are mere specializations or combinations. Descartes enumerates six primitive passions (which num- ber Spinoza afterward reduced one-half) — admiratio, amor et odium, cupiditas {dhir), gaildium et trisiitia. The first and the fourth have no opposites, the former being neither positive nor negative, and the latter both at once. Wonder, which includes under it esteem and contempt, signifies in- terest in an object which neither attracts us by its utility nor repels us by its hurtfulness, and yet does not leave us indifferent. It is aroused by the powerful or surprising impression made by the extraordinary, the rare, the unex-