Page:History of Iowa From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century Volume 3.djvu/98

 The Republican candidates for Representatives in Congress were elected in eight of the nine districts, as follows: George W. McCrary in the First; J. Q. Tufts in the Second;  L. L. Ainsworth, Democrat, in the Third; H. O. Pratt in the Fourth; James Wilson in the Fifth; E. S. Sampson in the Sixth; John A. Kasson in the Seventh; J. W. McDill in the Eighth; and Addison Oliver in the Ninth.

The act of the Legislature of 1874, known as the “Grange Law”, fixing the schedule of rates to be charged by railroads for transporting freight and passengers, went into effect in July of that year. Most of the railroads complied with the provisions, reluctantly however, some making vigorous protest. The Burlington and Missouri River Railroad, operated by the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, determined to test the validity of the law in the courts and obtained a temporary injunction restraining the Attorney-General of Iowa from prosecuting the company, and the State Treasurer from paying out money for the expense of such prosecution. The case was brought before John F. Dillon, Judge of the United States Circuit Court for the District of Iowa, to have the injunction made perpetual. The position taken by the railroad company in the case was that the company had the exclusive power to fix the measure of its own compensation and that the act of 1874 was in violation of its chartered rights. After a full hearing Judge Dillon denied the injunction and in rendering his decision said:

“Without further enlarging upon the public nature and uses of railroads or undertaking to review the authorities cited or examine the positions assumed by counsel, which would necessarily lead through a broad field of discussion, I content myself on this branch of the subject with stating as my conclusion that the Legislature has not expressly conferred on railway corporations in this State the exclusive power to fix their own charges, and such a power cannot be deduced by implication from the constitutional act of the corporations and that whatever powers are conferred in this respect are subject to an implied condition that they shall not be oppressively or unreasonably exercised and also subject to the future exercise of the police