Page:History of Greece Vol XII.djvu/111

 PERSIAN AEMY IN PHRYGlA. 79 division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leatlership of Alexander — he enforced the necessity of employing their numei'ous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves — in order to render any con- siderable advance of the invading force impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia ; that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility against him from the Greeks and other neighbors.* Had this plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money, we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own dominions ; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for the time have been suspended. But he Avas rescued ft-om this dilemma by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian leaders. ' Compare the policy recommended Ly Memnon, as set forth in Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority of Diodorns is licro incontestable. He proclaims distinctly botli the defensive and the oifensive side of Memnon's policy ; which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less elTective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive — the retreat and destruction of the country ; which, if adopted alone, could hardly have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander, and might reasonbly be called in question by the Persian generals. Moreover, we should fonn but a poor idea of Memnon's ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of the irresistible Persian fleet. I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodorus, because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian ; he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric, which contrasts favorably both with Diodorus and with Curtius ; but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.