Page:History of Greece Vol VII.djvu/292

274 74 HISTORY OF GREECE camp, the Syracusans well knew that its efficiency must diminish by every month's delay, while their own strength, in spite of heavy cost and effort, was growing with their increased prospects of success. If this double conviction was present to sustain the ardor of the Syracusans, it was not less painfully felt amidst the Athenian camp, now blocked up like a besieged city, and enjoying no free movement except through their ships and their command of the sea, Nikias saw that if Gylippus should return with any con- siderable additional force, even the attack upon him by land A'ould become too powerful to resist, besides the increasing disor- ganization of his fleet. He became fully convinced that to remain as they were was absolute ruin. As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully was now at an end, a sound judgment would have dictated that his position in the harbor had become useless as well as dangerous, and that the sooner it was evacu- ated the better. Probably Demosthenes would have acted thus, under similar circumstances ; but such foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias, who was afraid, moreover, of the blame which it would bring down upon him at home, if not from his own army. Not venturing to quit his position without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an undis- guised account of his critical position, and to solicit either rein- forcements or instructions to return. It was now, indeed, the end of September (B.C. 414), so that he could not even hope for an answer before midwinter, nor for rein- forcements, if such were to be sent, until the ensuing spring was far advanced. Nevertheless, he determined to encounter this risk, and to trust to vigilant precautions for safety during the interval, precautions which, as the result will show, were within a hair's breadth of proving insufficient. But as it was of the last importance to him to make his countrymen at home fully sensible of the grave danger of his position, he resolved to transmit a written despatch ; not trusting to the oral statement of a messenger, who might be wanting either in courage, in presence of mind, or in competent expression, to impress the full and sac", truth upon * reluctant audience. 1 Accordingly he sent home a cespatch, which 1 Thiicyd vii, 8