Page:History of Greece Vol VII.djvu/172

154 154 HISTORY OF GREECE. Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiades went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities, he said, were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous, indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attach- ment. Ni man there considered himself as a permanent resident, nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt ; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels. detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assail- ants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they were not more desperate enemies now than they had been in former days : ' they might invade Attica by land whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not ; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade per- forming obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies ? To be sure, f/it-y could bring no he!p to Attica in return ; but Athens did not va:U them on her own side of the water ; she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited ; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such invitations. She could not MOW set limits to the extent of her imperial sway ; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects, on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily ; at least she would humble Syracuse : in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias 1 Thucyd, vi, 17. Kal vvv ovre uveXTTiaroi TTCJ /tuAtov neAoirovvfiaioi if e-yevovro, el-re KOL rruw eppuv-cu, etc. The construction of avekxia-oi here is not certain: yet I cannot think that the menning which Dr. Arnold and others assign to it is the most suit- able. It rather seems to mean the same as in vii, 4, and vii, 47 : '* enemiei beyond our hopes of being able to deal with."