Page:History of Greece Vol VI.djvu/498

 476 HISTORY OF GKEECE. liabilities even real and serious, when there is no discernible evi dence to suggest their approach ; much more when there is posi- tive evidence, artfully laid out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault substantially the same had been committed by Thucydides himself and his colleague Eukles a year and a half before, when they suffered Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis : not even taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the fleet at Eion. They were not men peculiarly rash and presumptuous, but igno- rant and unpractised, in a military sense ; incapable of keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching explosion. This military incompetence, which made Kleon fall into the trap laid for him by Brasidas, also made hkn take wrong meas- ures against the danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within were preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away before the enemy's attack could be brought to bear. 1 An abler officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind up their courage to the fighting-point : for up to that moment they had no idea of being called upon to fight ; and the courage of Grecian hoplites, taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder visi- ble both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the usual preliminaries of battle, was but too apt to prove deficient. To turn the right or unshielded flank to the enemy, was unavoidable, from the direction of the retreating movement ; nor is it reason- able to blame Kleon for this, as some historians have done, or for causing his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as Dr. Arnold seems to think. The grand fault seems to have consisted in not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for standing fight during their retreat. Let us add, however, and the remark, if it serves to explain Kleon's idea of being able to get away before he was actually assailed, counts Thucyd. v. 10. Olofiercf dttOer&ai UKE ?,i? '>>', etc.