Page:History of Greece Vol VI.djvu/226

 204 HISTORY OF GREECE. near the Cape Antirrhium, or the Molykric Rhium, as it was called, the opposite cape to the Achaic Rhium : the line be- tween them, seemingly about an English mile in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. The Messenian force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manoeuvring : while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, from tLe corresponding reason, feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, effacing all superiority of nautical skill. 1 If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Sala- mis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protections for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of manoeuvring introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea room is now not less cov- eted by Phoi mio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare. For six or seven days successively, the two fleets were drawn out against each other, Phormio trying to entice the Pelopon- nesians to the outside of the gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it. 8 To him, every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving : for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and reluctance, prevailing among their seamen, many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat, that Knemus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations ; insisting on the favorable prospect before them, pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected, and appealing to the inherent bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint, that while those who behaved well in the coming batile would receive due honor, the laggards would assuredly be pun-
 * Thucyd. ii, 86-89: compare vii, 36-49. 2 Thucyd. n. S6