Page:History of Greece Vol IX.djvu/49

 FLIGHT OF A6ROKOMAS. 27 ire to be deducted the one hundred soldiers of Menou's division, slain in Kilikia. The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of some importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three hundred thousand men, for the king, in Phoenicia and Syria), from whom they now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning amidst the king's army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement, that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior ; abandoning three defensible positions in succession 1. The Gates of Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. 3. The passage of the Euphra- tes. He appears to have been alarmed by the easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more, probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader. 1 Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency by bring- ing up his fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to trans- port a division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one day's march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by walls and gates ; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this pass against defenders ; but the posses* sion of the fleet doubtless enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended. 2 And here we cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting them ; whereas, on the king's side, all the numerous means and opportunities of defence are succes- 1 Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. 'A/7pOxd/tO{ (T ov TOVTO i-rroiriaev /W iirel rjitovai 'Kvpov EV KihiKip ovra, &i>aarp&paf in $on t/cvf, Traptl etc. 1 Diodor. xiv.