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 history deals with real men and real events; if we would learn their lessons rightly, we must not impose artificial limitations.

There are, then, two motives which should weigh with us in our selection of a hero. First, that he worked for principles which we believe to be fruitful, and which are our own by virtue of that belief. This is, so to say, the scientific basis of our choice. But when this has been determined there remains the second point—that our hero should also be the inspirer of our own action, and, as such, should be capable of imitation. Here, I think, we frequently find ourselves beset with difficulties.

The man lived in an age which is not our age, and his methods cannot be our methods. His position was not our position, and the forces which were at his command are not at our command. We have to translate him into other terms before we can use him for our purposes. There is great danger that in this process the hero should entirely disappear. Roughly speaking, we feel that we need instruction in two things—wisdom and virtue. Men who are called great are so called because they succeeded in some object which they set before themselves. Success means in all things an adaptation of means to ends, and in studying this process we can generally trace the dexterity, if not the wisdom, of the hero whom we are considering. But frequently his virtue is not equally conspicuous. We sorrowfully admit that the hero's methods are beyond our power in these days when law-courts are punctilious; and, indeed, were such that we have no wish to follow them, even if the