Page:Hillsborough Taylor Interim Report Cm765.pdf/57

 '''CHAPTER 18 POLICE'''

Choice of Ends by the Police

There was much bitterness amongst Liverpool supporters that they had to make do again for the second year with the Leppings Lane end. But, cogent as their complaints were, they amounted to reasons for choosing a different ground altogether. Given Hillsborough as the venue, I think the police were right to allocate the sections of the ground as they did. The direction of arrival and the need for segregation made it sensible and to reverse the 1988 arrangements would have made for confusion. As with choice of venue, I do not consider choice of ends was causative of the disaster. Had it been reversed, the disaster could well have occurred in a similar manner but to Nottingham supporters.

Police Planning

The Operational Order for 1989 left much unsaid. Apart from the lack of any provision for late or congested arrivals, or any provision for the avoidance of overcrowding on the terraces, there was a number of other omissions. For example, there was no specific deployment of officers to man the perimeter gates. The Order did not detail the duties of the mounted officers deployed at the Leppings Lane entrance, who included Liverpool officers to assist in marshalling their own fans. The duties of Superintendents (especially Mr Greenwood and Mr Marshall) were not defined so as to achieve clarity and efficiency. By an oversight, the provision requiring mobile (Tango) patrols to assist the emergency services was omitted from the text.

The 1988 Order was never substantially reviewed save to reduce the number of officers deployed in shopping areas and to emphasise in capital letters the embargo on fans having access to the pitch. Satisfaction with the 1988 event led to complacency. That some thought the pens overfull in 1988 and that the tunnel was closed off on that occasion did not figure in or influence the plan for 1989.

{{anchor+|275. Mr Duckenfield was promoted and put in charge of F Division only 21 days before this semi-final. The pre-planning was already in progress under Mr Mole who had been in command both in 1987 and in 1988. It might have been wiser to have left Mr Mole in charge of this operation. On the other hand, it is quite understandable that Mr Duckenfield should have been expected to take command of events in his Division from the date of his promotion. In view of his lack of experience at Hillsborough and of a semi-final match, however, it was imperative that he be fully briefed and that he should also brief himself.

{{Anchor+|276.}} He was not informed of the crushing incident in 1981 nor did he make inquiries which would have revealed it. He did not know the arrangement as between Club and police for monitoring the Leppings Lane terraces. He did not visit and tour the ground before approving the Operational Order. Although he attended a match on 2 April, there was only a small crowd present and he left control of the game to the Superintendents.

Policing on the Day

{{Anchor+|277.}} One of the regrettable features of the football scene as it has developed is the enormous expenditure of money, time and effort in employing large numbers of police all over the country to guard against the sort of disorder and misbehaviour which have become endemic. Police management of a game of football has become a military operation. The problems faced and the responses received must be disheartening and may have tended to harden police attitudes to supporters in general.

{{anchor+|278.}} It is fair to state that over many years the South Yorkshire Police have given excellent service to the public. They have handled crowd problems sensitively and successfully at a large number of football games including major matches, during strikes in the coal industry and the steel industry, and in other contexts. Unfortunately, their policing on 15 April broke down in the ways already described and, although there were other causes, the main reason for the disaster was the failure of police control.

{{anchor+|279.}} In all some 65 police officers gave oral evidence at the Inquiry. Sadly I must report that for the most part the quality of their evidence was in inverse proportion to their rank. There were many young Constables who as witnesses were alert, intelligent and open. On the day, they and many others strove heroically in ghastly circumstances aggravated by hostility to rescue and succour victims. They inspired confidence and hope.

{{anchor+|280.}} By contrast, with some notable exceptions, the senior officers in command were defensive and evasive witnesses. Their feelings of grief and sorrow were obvious and genuine. No doubt those feelings were intensified by the knowledge that such a disaster had occurred under their management. But, neither their handling of problems on the day nor their account of it in evidence showed the qualities of leadership to be expected of their rank. {{nop}} {{rh||49|}}