Page:Hillsborough Taylor Interim Report Cm765.pdf/51

 '''CHAPTER 13 THE CRUSHING NOT RECOGNISED'''

Observation from Control Room

As the stream from gate C flowed through the tunnel, the officers in the control room could be expected to keep a close watch on pens 3 and 4. They had a direct view of them from an elevated position through their window. Although they had no field-glasses, there was the zoom facility on the TV camera. The radio was by then working again and although reception was difficult due to crowd noise and possibly excessive air traffic on channel 25, attempts could have been made to alert officers on the perimeter track to watch for overcrowding and report their observations. In the event, pens 3 and 4 became more and more crowded, surges took place, fans were showing and signalling distress. None of this was seen or recognised in the control room.

Officers on the Track

The 20 officers detailed to the perimeter track were distributed round the pitch so that some five officers were at the west end. Their written instructions made no reference to the avoidance or detection of overcrowding. The same applied to the officers in the west stand. Mr Greenwood admitted that his oral briefings also contained no mention of monitoring the pens for overcrowding.

The Operational Order for 1988 had instructed officers to forbid anyone "access to the track from the terraces without the consent of a senior officer (except to receive medical attention)". At the end of the 1988 semi-final, there was a minor pitch invasion. Accordingly, that prohibition was emphasised in the 1989 Operational Order by being put into capital letters. The combination of no instructions as to overcrowding and a strong prohibition on opening the gates was likely to make police recognition of crushing slow and their response reluctant. Small wonder that the growing pressure and congestion between 2.50 pm and 2.59 pm went unheeded or certainly unremedied. Even when officers recognised there was a problem, the rule required consent of a senior officer before a gate could be opened.

"Senior officer" meant an officer of Inspector rank or higher. The Inspector in charge of the 20 officers on the track was Mr Darling. He stationed himself by the players' tunnel, the most central position for supervising his men. In evidence he said: ""I would only take action if I thought crowding had got to such a stage that the fans were in danger. I'd then inform ground control and I would expect someone deployed to the back of the stand.""

That underlines the inhibition against opening perimeter gates. So did the evidence of one Constable who said it had been so drummed into officers not to open the gates that when he saw distress in pen 4, he "debated" with himself before opening the gate, thinking: "If I'm wrong, I'm going to get a right bollocking for this." Naturally, one would hope that common sense and humanity would make some officers cut through the rules and open a gate if fans were clearly in distress.

This is what happened, but not until officers recognised the distress and even then not immediately. Hence, gates 3 and 4, having been opened, were shut again before they were finally opened and at first those seeking to climb out over the fence were pushed back. This reaction of the police did not go on for as long as some witnesses believed. They probably misinterpreted the hand movements from Mr Greenwood and others aimed at persuading fans to move back and relieve the pressure as attempts to stop those climbing out at the front.

Nevertheless, there was a period during which the failure to recognise the problem and the inhibition against tackling it caused vital time to be lost. Rh