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 any part in the South Yorkshire Police plans. Had the latter been informed of the history contained in the dossier and summarised above it may well have influenced police strategy in Leppings Lane.

There is presently a proposal that a national computer-based police football intelligence system should be set up to make the necessary information readily available.

Police Intelligence on the Day'

The unfilled space in the Liverpool areas inside the ground, the figures for entry available from the Club's computer and observations on the video screen should have enabled those in the control room to monitor the numbers arriving and still to arrive at Leppings Lane. Radio contact with mobile (Tango) patrols detailed to monitor licensed premises in the district could have indicated the numbers still to come. But at 2.30 pm when Mr Murray told Mr Duckenfield they would "get them all in by 3 o'clock" he seems not to have appreciated that in addition to those visible at the turnstiles there were many more still to come. Certainly, Mr Marshall outside the turnstiles was not told and could not otherwise have known that there were still many Liverpool ticket holders to arrive.

Mr Marshall and Mr Greenwood

The division of command between these two officers did not help. Mr Marshall was in charge of the serials outside the perimeter gates in the Leppings Lane area and in the roads beyond. In practice he operated inside and just outside the turnstile area. Mr Greenwood's area as Ground Commander extended from the pitch to the perimeter gates. He in fact stationed himself near the players' tunnel. He was wholly unaware of the growing problems at the turnstiles and was in no position to exercise control over his officers who were under pressure there. No-one in the control room thought to tell him.

Control Lost

In the result, the large concentration of arrivals from 2.30 pm to 2.40 pm pressed unrestrained into the turnstile area through the perimeter gates which were fully open. When that area was full, later arrivals swelled the crowd out to the forecourt and even into the road. As already recounted, the foot officers at the turnstiles became trapped and endangered and retired through the turnstiles. The mounted officers could not operate amidst such a dense crowd in a confined space. They came out of the turnstile area. There were then the belated attempts to close the perimeter gates and prevent more fans joining the mass until it had a chance to diminish through the turnstiles; still later the attempt to put a cordon of horses across the entrance.

Despite knowledge of the difficult layout, the very large number of fans to be got through so few turnstiles and the tendency of fans to arrive in the last half hour, no contingency plans were made to avoid a crush such as occurred. Even on the day, the need to close Leppings Lane to traffic before 2.30 pm and the other available intelligence already summarised, should have prompted those in command to take precautions against such a crush. If some of the perimeter gates had been closed and cordons of mounted and foot officers had been placed a little distance from those gates, the flow of fans into the turnstile area could have been controlled before that area became engulfed. It was the crush itself which produced the frustration and the panic and brought out the worst in those who had drunk too much. Earlier control of entry would have prevented the crush and maintained the good mood which had prevailed until 2.30 pm.

It should moreover have been obvious by 2.40 pm, if not earlier, that a large part of the crowd could not be admitted until well after 3 pm. Had a decision to postpone kick-off been made and announced much of the frustration and with it the impetus crushing the crowd would have been reduced. A combination of controlled filtering and a postponed kick-off would probably have obviated the need to open the gates.

Postponement of Kick-off

At various stages in his evidence, Mr Duckenfield gave three accounts of why he thought it too late to postpone kick-off. Once it was that one of the teams had already come onto the pitch. Then it was that a group of photographers at the tunnel had wrongly led him to think that the teams were coming out. Finally, he did not know why he thought the teams were coming out. They did not in fact come onto the pitch until 2.54 pm, two minutes after gate C was opened. Police Constable Buxton had asked for a postponement of kick-off before gate C was opened. It should not, however, have needed a police Constable in the thick of the crowd (and there were others of like mind) to think of postponing the kick-off. The need should have been clear in the control room.

The truth was that Mr Duckenfield applied inflexibly the policy he had discussed with Mr Murray. Kick-off would not be postponed unless there were some major cause for delayed arrivals eg a jam on the Rh