Page:Highway Needs of the National Defense.pdf/108

88 States before the final point of assembly was reached. This typically American procedure allowed more direct participation in the war effort by thousands of small plants through subcontracting and by millions of workers who might have otherwise been excluded. And while the procedure took jobs closer to the available labor force and minimized the need for personal transportation, it created additional demands on motor vehicles. Because of the unavailability of other transportation and because of the convenience and flexibility of trucks and combinations, a high percentage of materials and subassemblies flowed between parts of the production lines by motor vehicles. One study of a large number of war plants revealed that these plants received 65 percent of their incoming freight and shipped out 69 percent of their outgoing freight by motortruck.



This is the record of motor-vehicle transportation in World War II. Should another such emergency arise, another record, differing in details but essentially of the same character, will be marked up. The decentralization of industry has continued during the postwar years; and has received official encouragement as a precaution against atomic- bomb and guided-missile attacks. It seems probable, therefore, that in a future struggle all forms of motor-vehicle transportation, and the roads and streets over which they travel, will be more essential to the war economy than in the preceding one.