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68 war. To know why, would be invaluable to us, but no reason is vouchsafed. It is to be presumed that they subsequently co-operated in the return of Hannibal's army to Carthage—a task accomplished without any interference from Rornan ships—but their failure to take the offensive is inexplicable, unless it be that the Carthaginians, having in mind the invasion of Regulus in the first Punic War, anticipated that, with Hannibal in command, a land victory would be easy, and kept their ships in hand against the arrival of Roman reinforcements, and for cutting off all retreat when the anticipated rout of Scipio should occur.

Roman Sea Power landed troops in Spain, intended to cut off Hannibal. This it failed to do, but under the two Scipios it carried on war in Spain behind Hannibal's back and delayed his overland reinforcements. This action had another result also. Mago, Hannibal's brother, who was sailing with 12,000 troops to Italy to reinforce his brother directly from Carthage, was ordered to land in Spain instead. In a word the Carthaginians were able to use the sea when they chose. Hannibal, too, was in constant communication with his home government and had his demands for reinforcements been complied with, no Sea Power that she possessed could have saved Rome. Carthage having elected to make the issue a land one, Rome did the like, and neither nation relied much upon Sea Power. Indeed, when Scipio invaded Africa,