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Rh that her fleet was the better one, and her torpedo attack on the fleet at Port Arthur was planned and expected to produce considerably more results than it actually achieved. Rome apparently had no idea of using such ships as she had for any purpose save as transports.

Let us now, as on a previous occasion, suppose some one conversant with all the theories of Sea Power and deductions therefrom, but entirely ignorant of the actual results of this Roman invasion of Sicily. Let him be given the conditions and requested to forecast the results. In how far would his forecast agree with what actually happened? Would he prove that communications being cut (as they were) the Roman army would accomplish nothing? Would he foresee the 'silent steady pressure of Sea Power' driving the Romans inland till, recognising the inevitable, they surrendered at discretion? Would he foresee, the actual result, the over-running of Sicily by the Roman soldiers; Carthaginian Sea Power doing no more than rendering insecure Roman tenure of coast captures, and permitting raids on the Italian coast—wearying Rome it is true, but achieving nothing towards defeating her? Or would he predict Carthage, having complete command of the sea, pouring troops into Sicily till the Romans, however superior in individual courage, were annihilated by force of numbers?

Carthage, as already stated, was for purposes of defence and offence managed essentially on 'Blue