Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/47

Rh confined space is a disadvantage. Unless the captain of a ship see his enemy a good way off, he cannot advance or ram properly; nor can he retreat at need when pressed. The manœuvres suitable for fast vessels, such as breaking the line or circling under the enemy's stern, cannot be practised in a narrow space, for here the sea fight must of necessity be reduced to a land fight, in which numbers tell. In the moment of action remember the value of silence and order, things always important in war, especially at sea.'

There is any amount of sound principle in either address, and plenty of regard for the science of killing the enemy—which was the business in hand. But is there visible here any conception of the theory that the ancients bothered about grand principles of strategical results elsewhere to follow from their operations as a distinct sequel?

We can, by judicious selection, build up such a theory even out of the fragments here quoted. We can take Thucydides' opening remarks about ships and without any imagination say: This indicates that the general sentiment among the educated Greeks was that Sea Power had won the war against Troy, consequently it was recognised by those in authority at Athens that the 'steady silent pressure' of Athenian Sea Power would, properly applied, bring Sparta to her knees. The long walls to Piræus, the only expenditure on 'bricks and mortar' sanctioned, show