Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/29

 Rh But, what can we deduce therefrom? First we must know for certain whether our data are correct. We must know exactly the relative efficiencies of the combatants—a thing that, of course, we cannot be certain about. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument that in some mysterious way we have all essential facts, can we in any way apply the battle of Naupaktis to modern naval warfare?

To a limited extent we can. We can or could say that it is hereby shown that genius may in certain circumstances neutralise superior numbers. Alongside this we may as certainly put 'Only numbers can annihilate,' or any similar proverb also based on the teachings of history.

More than this we cannot do. We cannot assign any factor to skill in relation to numbers, even if exact data from history were procurable; since they are not to be procured, we are more helpless still. This particular battle off Naupaktis can, in fine, be made to prove or controvert any modern theory according to the taste of the user, and the same thing to a greater or less extent is true of all past warfare. The current dogma runs to the effect that 'tactics alter, but the main principles of strategy alter not.' This, of course, will be denied by none in a general sense; but, directly we begin to apply it, are not pitfalls innumerable? Does not a weak point lie in the fact that there is nothing to prevent any faddist from selecting his own incidents to prove any theory he may wish? Is it