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Rh would not generally quibble about. So are the most accessible naval 'facts' differentiated from the propositions of Euclid.

When versions disagree we have to ask which side had the largest motive for untruthfulness, which had the best or worst reputation that way, and so on and so forth. Enquiries in that direction necessitating endless research, produce a perfect enough balance of evidence: and points cannot really be cleared up. History, as required for naval purposes, is a mass of similar instances; probabilities are the most we can depend on at the best, and probabilities are far removed from absolute facts.

To prove the immutability theory of the great principles of war, we have, too, to dip into ancient history, to take authorities who were avowed partisans, and as likely as not only one side comes down to us.

What, for instance, was the Persian version of the battle of Salamis? We know the Greek tale well enough, but there are possible improbabilities in it. The Athenians had no very special naval skill at that period: they were certainly not technically superior to some of the Persian auxiliaries—the Phoenicians and Egyptians, for example. No doubt there was a battle of Salamis, no doubt the Greeks won; but a Persian version of it would probably tell of two or three of their ships overwhelmed by the Greek fleet!