Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/267

Rh unaware of the exact abilities of British submarines, but probably the Germans know everything there is to know for practical purposes; and can assess the fighting value of them to a nicety. Similarly there are plenty of jealously guarded German secrets that are common knowledge in the British Navy. Ordinary naval secrets are indeed more suggestive of the hidden head of the ostrich than aught else; and it may be taken for granted that the concealment of losses or blunders in war will be impossible where the enemy is concerned. It may be successful at home; but such methods of bolstering up the leader who is a failure (for in sum that is what it amounts to) can never win wars and may conceivably help to lose them.

Of course the hypothetical press muzzle would chiefly be used (in theory at any rate) to conceal movements and prevent the enemy discovering the whereabouts of the fleet. This was done by the Japanese; who saw nothing ludicrous in the intelligence that 'a certain squadron left a certain place on a certain date to arrive at a certain place at a certain date, as "prearranged.' Such a policy may do for a time; but the resulting loss of public interest in a war is a heavy price to pay for it. Wars are won by the fittest to win, by the fitness of the nation rather than by the fitness of a few individuals; and a nation that is bored over its war news is not well in the way to exhibit those staying qualities so necessary for the successful conduct of a great war. Here is the crux of