Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/25

 Rh We are compelled to answer that he cannot always, compelled to confess that the very best he can do is to give us what may be but relative truth. Only of late have historians attempted to do this; and the historian of to-day, labour as he will, is compelled to give credence to such internal evidence as most appeals to his sense of fact.

As a base for modern naval history there is also the official despatch; but who that has seen official reports in the making will allow infallibility to them? To take a great and a small case: If there were one thing that seemed more certainly established than another it was the formation of the British fleet and its plan of action at Trafalgar. Yet a few years ago a great naval authority produced a deal of evidence to show that our accepted version of that attack was entirely incorrect. He failed to convince many that his theory was the true one, but unquestionably he left the matter in a doubt from which it has never emerged. Official reports by the yard are available; but absolute certainty as to British tactics on that memorable day is not for us. An historian, too, may yet arise to show that the importance of the victory was far less than the world has so far held it. Dumanoir may appear in a new light: even quite a plausible case may be made out to show that the British victory was a triumph of luck over bad dispositions. This is a very extreme case, and it is not suggested that the tendencies of many modern historians will have such an apotheosis; but, supposing