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Rh Of course the Roman invasion was over a very small space of water, and the Carthaginian fleet was somewhere else. It was also not expecting the invasion or, at any rate, not on the spot to try to prevent it.

These conditions were peculiar; but this invasion is of infinitely more importance to Great Britain than anything attempted or believed to have been projected by Napoleon. Assuming Napoleon's projects to have been as serious as Englishmen of his day believed, the action of the British fleet spells no more than the obvious moral which needs no historical demonstration whatever, that the defending fleet must be discounted. The fate of crowded transports with a few hostile cruisers among them is too certain to need discussion. The essential of success is to discount the defending fleet.

There are two ways in which this can be done: the first by the obvious and historical method of beating it; the second by the Roman method against which the fleet is of very small avail, because surprise landings in force being once effected, it is—at any rate if the invading troops be good enough material—relatively easy to run over stores and fresh troops in individual ships, as the Japanese did in 1904 when the Vladivostok cruisers threatened communications. By 'relatively easy,' something that looks sufficiently possible to cause it to be attempted should be understood. The problem of an invading army once landed in England being solved, other risks would be faced cheerfully