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Rh one and the same thing. England believed absolutely in the invasion threat: it is not impossible that the threat was his chief purpose,—the invasion to be materialised only in the somewhat unlikely event of his fleets succeeding in combining and in winning a big battle at sea.

The reasons against the Napoleonic invasion being a really serious project are numerous. In the first place, Napoleon was undoubtedly a marvellous genius, a man little likely to make miscalculations, and altogether unlikely to fail at profiting by past experience. Past experience in Egypt cannot but have convinced him that to attempt over-sea operations in face of a superior and unbeaten fleet was dangerous; therefore it is extremely unlikely that he contemplated any replica of the invasion of Egypt, or any imitation of the Spanish Armada such as was believed by the people of England. It is infinitely more probable that, as suggested above, his design was to try to win command of the sea, and after that materialise his invasion project. His scheme if taken thus was, of course, sound enough.

As for the boats intended to convey the invaders, they first became a factor in 1801—that is towards the end of the first war. Those collected were then altogether inadequate for any invasion. When Nelson was put in command in the Channel to defend against the dreaded invasion, almost the first thing he did was to demonstrate that the invasion was