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160 there is nothing but land between a man and the hostile armies, he is very apt to forget the extent of the distance or his own armies barring the way.

3. Decline from other causes. This should by no means be forgotten. The change from wood to iron was of itself sufficient to greatly dislocate the American shipping industry.

4. Anti-corsair dispositions. The English in the war with France carried on a vigorous campaign against the privateers with little mercy and much hate. This tended to render the corsairs nervous, and if one eye was still on attack, one was also always on escape.

To the Confederates 'escape' was less ever present. If captured the crews had no barbarous treatment to dread, they were recognised 'naval men,' and—the war being a civil one—many of them, inspired in their career by the desire of gain as much, or more, than by any convictions, probably had in mind that sides could be changed if the worst came to the worst. Such considerations were of some assistance to them. Then, too, the principal Northern effort was concentrated in the blockade of the Southern Coasts: the ships devoted to dealing with the corsairs were neither many nor, as a rule, well suited to the task. The general dispositions were poor. Individual ships wandered blindly about seeking individual corsairs: only a portion of effort was devoted to 'stopping the earths.' The inordinate number of these 'earths' has already been alluded to: