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120 of the Nile they had plenty of warrant in the study of recent history to support their belief that they were quite safe. A study of ancient history would have told them that such positions had sometimes been safe and sometimes not, and perhaps impressed Brueys with the fact that the real teaching of history is that 'there is nothing to be learned, save that "the impossible" may always occur.' It was left for Nelson, in the signal victory of Aboukir Bay to shatter all theories as to the immunity of a fleet anchored in a protected bay. Yet at Algeciras, not so very long afterwards, Sir James Saumarez with six ships was handsomely beaten by four French ones lying in the bay. At Navarino on the other hand the Turkish fleet found no safety in a bay.

If we select the Nile, Navarino, Actium, Sphakteria and other similar instances a fleet lying in a bay is doomed to destruction: but if we turn our attention to Algeciras, and many an action between that and Salamis, the exact opposite is to be proved. Obviously then it is unsafe to draw any deduction from history in this matter other than that 'it is the unexpected which happens.'

Modern history does not supply much in the way of instances of battles in this particular situation. The Russians on February 9, 1904, inferior in ships but supported by forts were to some extent so situated in Port Arthur Bay when attacked by Togo with a superior force of ships. Togo never pressed home his