Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/139

Rh would have been very great. He could have blockaded Port Arthur only with his entire force and then with great difficulty, leaving the Vladivostok division free to cut the communication of the invading army. The Kussians did things badly and failed, but this is no proof that the brilliant possibilities alluded to did not exist; or that in some such division in the hereafter unexpected power may not be found.

Tactically, the 'divided squadron' is usually put under the head of a twentieth-century idea. It is an idea somewhat difficult to define, but in essence it embodies decentralisation as a means for truer concerted action. To take the case in a simpler form it is easier for two squadrons of six ships each, properly placed, to concentrate the guns of twelve ships on a portion of the enemy than it is for twelve ships in one long line to do so. It rests also on the fact that whereas each broadside had an equal value in the old days so that one ship between two others could give each her full power, in these days the principal armament being mounted to bear on either broadside a ship can put full power upon one side only. And since in a line of twelve ships there are bound to be some at one or other end of the line unable to deliver an effective fire at the psychological moment, it follows that the divided ships may have greater chances of securing a 'two to one' advantage. On the other hand, unless well-handled they may be separately engaged and lose more than they gain. Only a very efficient fleet,