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96 months, and the capitulation must ever remain as a disgrace to the Russian arms.

After the capture of Port Arthur, nothing was done by the Japanese except to await the arrival of the Baltic Fleet under Rogestvensky. The fleet merely lay in Tsushima Straits. It drilled industriously for battle, but it certainly did not contribute to carrying on the war. The Baltic Fleet was badly officered, though Rogestvensky himself was a capable man, and according to his lights tried to drill it into efficiency. No one, however, seems to have realised what war meant, the genius of Togo and the capability of his men were not at all understood. The result was a foregone conclusion—at the psychological moment it was found that the Russians could not shoot in bad weather, and some ships seem to have been in a state akin to mutiny. Mostly, however, the Russians fought bravely enough, as they lay in a muddled circle with the Japanese around them. The affair was almost a battue, as ship after ship came up and crumbled away under the welldirected Japanese fire and then succumbed to equally well-directed torpedo attack. Four ships surrendered. The Japanese sustained no damage worthy of the name. And so the naval war ended.

It is the fashion to attribute Japan's success to Togo's genius and Japanese nautical skill, but these reasons are hardly the real ones. Togo's genius,