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314   year not having elapsed since the property was offered for sale under the first execution.

I have looked into the opinion of the supreme court of the United States, in the case of Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, and from an attentive and deliberate examination of the doctrine there settled, I can perceive nothing which can justly authorize the inference that that court would declare our State valuation law inoperative and void, as being in conflict with the constitution of the United States. The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy to enforce it, is clearly stated by the chief justice who delivered the opinion. In their nature they are different and distinct things. The obligation of a contract arises at the time the contract is made, and continues until it be performed or discharged. The remedy to enforce the obligation of the contract does not arise until there is a failure to perform the obligation. They are, then, not identical, but different and distinct things. The constitution prohibits laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and is silent with regard to laws relating to the remedies by which contracts are to be enforced.

In the opinion referred to, the chief justice states the doctrine in the following terms: "If the laws of the State, passed afterwards, had done nothing more than change the remedy upon contracts of this description, they would be liable to no constitutional objection. For, undoubtedly, a State may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding in its courts, in relation to past contracts as well as future. And although a new remedy may be deemed less convenient than the old one, and may in some degree render the recovery of debts more tardy and difficult, yet it will not follow that the law is unconstitutional. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy, may be altered according to the will of the State, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy, or directly on the contract itself. In either case it is prohibited by the constitution." The chief justice further says: "It is difficult perhaps to draw a line that would be applicable in all cases, between legitimate alterations of the remedy, and