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308   to the laws of the United States, and on this ground a writ of habeas corpus was prayed to be directed to the commanding officer at Fort Washita, requiring the body of George B. Keeler to be produced, together with the cause of his detention, to undergo and receive what the judge should consider concerning him, in the premises.

The application was verified by the affidavit of the applicant, purporting to be sworn to before a justice of the peace of the State of New York, but was not otherwise authenticated, nor his official character otherwise proved.

S. H Hempstead, for the applicant. 

 OPINION OF THE COURT.—The judicial act of 1789 (1 Story, L. U.S. sec. 14, p. 59) authorizes all the courts of the United States to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute which may be neces­sary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions and agree­ able to the principles and usages of law. And it is expressly provided by the same act, that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment, with the restriction only that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to pris­oners in jail, unless where they are in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.

In the case of Tobias Watkins, 3 Peters, 201, it was said by Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, that "no law of the United States prescribes the cases in which the writ shall be issued, nor the power of the court over the party brought up by it." The term is used in the constitution as one which was well understood, and the judicial act authorizes this court and all the courts of the United States, and the judges thereof, to issue the writ "for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment." This general reference to a power which we are required to exercise without any precise definition of it, impresses on us the necessity of making some inquiries into its use according to that law which is in a con­siderable degree incorporated into our own.