Page:Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion Co. v. Talevski.pdf/74

6 .” We have recognized as much when holding that a materially identical saving clause did not authorize implied remedies under a separate remedial provision. See AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC, 593 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2021) (slip op., at 12–13). And in the §1983 context, we have similarly held that saving clauses do “not ‘refer to a suit for redress of a violation of the statut[e] at issue.’ ” Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 126–127 (alterations omitted); accord, Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 20–21, n. 31.

These results are understandable. There is a considerable difference between preserving existing remedies for conduct that happens to violate other laws and providing a one-stop remedy for the precise provisions in a statute. See Alexander, 532 U. S., at 289–290. The latter interpretation runs against a century of holdings that a statute “ ‘cannot be held to destroy itself’ ” through a saving clause. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 227–228 (1998) (quoting Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907)). Conversely, concluding that FNHRA “may be enforced only through the statute’s express remed[ies]” gives full effect to §1396r(h)(8) because “the claims available under §1983 prior to the enactment of the [Act] continue to be available.” Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 126.

In short, “[a]llowing a plaintiff to circumvent [FNHRA’s] administrative remedies would be inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored scheme.” Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1012 (1984). I would thus hold that the Act precludes enforcement under §1983 and reverse the judgment below. I therefore respectfully dissent.