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Rh down to what Congress intended, as divined from text and context.” (majority opinion). Notably, we have explicitly held that this standard does not demand anything close to the level of incompatibility required to trigger implied repeal. See Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 120, and n. 2 (2005); see (opinion of ). Instead, the question is simply “whether the rights created by a later statute ‘may be asserted within the remedial framework’ of the earlier one.” Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120, n. 2; see ''Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny'', 442 U. S. 366, 375–378 (1979). As the majority explains, §1983 does not apply where Congress has created an individual right but also “simultaneously given good reason (detectable with ordinary interpretive tools) to conclude that the §1983 remedy is not available.” ; see, e.g., Armstrong, 575 U. S., at 328 (presumption of equitable remedies rebutted by administrative remedies and statutory requirements).

Finally, I agree that there is no bright-line rule for when a statute evidences an intent to preclude §1983 relief. See Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 122; (majority opinion);  (opinion of ). Courts should consider a “wide range of contextual clues, like ‘enforcement provisions’ ” that government officials can invoke and “any ‘administrative remedies that the statute offers.’ ” (opinion of ). Whatever the context, the “more comprehensive the [enforcement] scheme” in a statute, “the less likely that it leaves the door open for §1983 suits.” Ibid. After all, when a statute “ ‘provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under §1983.’ ” Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 20 (1981).