Page:Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion Co. v. Talevski.pdf/70

2 Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private right of action,” I also agree that there is no room for “a multifactor balancing test to pick and choose which federal requirements may be enforced by §1983 and which may not.” Id., at 286, 290 (emphasis added) (rejecting the standard articulated in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 340–341 (1997)). None of this is new ground. We have previously held that Gonzaga “plainly repudiate[s] the ready implication of a §1983 action that” our earlier decisions “exemplified.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U. S. 320, 330, n. (2015).

The two FNHRA provisions that respondent invokes demonstrate what it takes to satisfy this demanding standard. First, the Act mandates that a “nursing facility must protect and promote the rights of each resident, including … [t]he right to be free from … chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience and not required to treat medical symptoms.” 42 U. S. C. §1396r(c)(1)(A). Second, the Act protects “[t]ransfer and discharge rights,” precluding a “nursing facility” from transferring or discharging “each resident” except in certain circumstances. §1396r(c)(2)(A) (boldface deleted). Both of these provisions explicitly use the term “rights” to describe discrete and concrete duties that a defined party (“nursing facility”) owes to a particular individual (“each resident”). When these features are taken together, they satisfy the standard for determining whether a personal right exists. See Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 285–286; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 288–289 (2001).

When determining whether individual rights are enforceable under §1983, I again see much common ground with the majority and agree entirely with Barrett’s explanation of the governing standard. That question “boils