Page:Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion Co. v. Talevski.pdf/57

Rh and the provision of maternity benefits depended on “the power of the cooperating states to compel birth registration, the licensing of mid-wives, etc.” Ibid. Thus, more than 100 years after Monroe’s Views, it was still well understood that the Federal Government’s spending power needed to work with “the wider coercive powers of the states” to accomplish its ends. Ibid. And, a State’s acceptance of federal funds in return for exercising its own powers did not expand the Federal Government’s legislative powers.

In sum, from the framing of the Constitution to well into the 20th century, it was virtually undisputed that Congress’ spending power was nothing more than a power to spend. It included no regulatory authority to bind parties, to secure rights or impose duties with the force of federal law, and no authority to directly regulate the States even with their consent.

When cases concerning expansive federal spending programs first began to reach this Court, they vividly illustrated both the enduring understanding of the spending power as a nonregulatory power and the contractual understanding of spending conditions. The Federal Government defended major spending programs on the basis of that understanding, and the programs survived this Court’s review only because of those traditional premises. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), the Court rejected as nonjusticiable Massachusetts’ claim that the Maternity Act of 1921 was “an attempt to legislate outside the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution and within the field of local powers exclusively reserved to the States.” Id., at 482. The Court first stated that it “[p]robably … would be sufficient to point out that the powers of the State are not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the State is free to accept or reject.” Id., at 480. In other words, the