Page:Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion Co. v. Talevski.pdf/29

Rh

, with whom joins, concurring.

Today’s opinion makes three important points. First, Maine v. Thiboutot remains good law. 448 U. S. 1 (1980). Second, Gonzaga University v. Doe sets the standard for determining when a Spending Clause statute confers individual rights, and the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA) satisfies it. 536 U. S. 273 (2002). Third, courts must carefully consider whether individual rights established by a Spending Clause statute are enforceable through 42 U. S. C. §1983—in the FNHRA’s case, they are.

As to the first point: Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very person” who, under color of state law, violates “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” In Thiboutot, we held that the plain language of the statute was not limited to “some subset of laws.” 448 U. S., at 4. Rather, the term “laws” encompasses all federal laws, including those passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause authority. Ibid. Like the Court, I would not abandon that holding based on petitioners’ novel contract-law theory.

Second, our decision in Gonzaga establishes the standard for analyzing whether Spending Clause statutes give rise to