Page:Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion Co. v. Talevski.pdf/26

22 much less a license for us to construct and impute congressional intent that the FNHRA does not embody.

The difficulty for HHC and the United States is that implicit preclusion, in this context, requires something in the statute that shows that permitting §1983 to operate would “thwar[t] Congress’ intent” in crafting the FNHRA. Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 253. We see nothing in the FNHRA that even hints at Congress’s intent in this regard; if anything, the language of the Act confirms otherwise, for it plainly states that “[t]he remedies provided under” its enforcement-process subsection are “in addition to those otherwise available under State or Federal law and shall not be construed as limiting such other remedies.” §1396r(h)(8) (emphasis added). We will not rewrite §1396r(h)(8) in lieu of rewriting §1983.

At oral argument, HHC’s counsel remarked that the “right question” is “what rights are secured by law within