Page:Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion Co. v. Talevski.pdf/23

Rh unambiguously secure.

As explained in Part III–A, supra, the FNHRA details administrative processes concerning inspection of covered nursing facilities and accountability for noncompliant facilities. But the statute lacks any indicia of congressional intent to preclude §1983 enforcement, such as an express private judicial right of action or any other provision that might signify that intent. See, e.g., id., at 121 (“[T]he existence of a more restrictive private remedy [in the statute itself] for statutory violations has been the dividing line between those cases in which we have held that an action would lie under §1983 and those in which we have held that it would not”). Nor has HHC otherwise demonstrated that enforcement via §1983 would thwart the operation of the administrative remedial scheme in any respect.

HHC’s argument that we need look no further than the detail of the FNHRA’s enforcement mechanisms to find conclusive evidence of implicit preclusion is unpersuasive. Implicit preclusion is shown by a “ ‘comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under §1983.’ ” Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 252 (emphasis added). HHC’s single-minded focus on comprehensiveness mistakes the shadow for the substance, and it disregards the import of these FNHRA provisions’ unambiguous conferral of rights. The attendant presumption is that §1983 can play its textually prescribed role as a vehicle for enforcing those rights, even alongside a detailed enforcement regime that also protects those interests, so long as §1983 enforcement is not “ ‘incompatible’ ” with Congress’s handiwork. Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120, 122; Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 347–348 (1997) (collecting cases).

To be clear, a defendant can discharge its burden of showing that the presumption is rebutted by pointing to a comprehensive scheme. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 20 (1981)