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RhTERM, 1866.] destroy the rights of property, than the one under consideration, if the construction of the ordinance contended for by the counsel for the defendant should be adopted.

This late and important decision of the supreme court, then, is not only conclusive as to the limitation of the power of the state convention, by the constitution of the United States, but it also settles the question as to the extent of that limitation, in the preservation of the free exercise of pursuits most conducive to man's happiness, or support; and to protection in the use and enjoyment of the property acquired by him.

In view of all which, we are satisfied that tie convention of 1864, (if, upon further inquiry, it should appear that it so intended,) had not the power to declare the constitution of 1861, and the acts of the state government under it, void. Thus, it will be seen, that unless the word, "entire" can, without destroying the sense of the ordinance, be limited in its.meaning, it must, necessarily, lead to the conclusions at which we have just arrived. The rule of construction, as laid down by this court, in Wilson vs. Biseoe, 6 Eng., p. 18, and which is alike applicable to constitutions, as well as acts of the legislature, is, that such construction (if possible) should be given to the act, that no clause, sentence, or word shall be void, superfluous or insignificant; but if, from a view of the whole act, the intention is different from the literal import of its terms, then, the intent should prevail. And in ''Kelly's heirs vs. McGuire and wife, 15 Ark. Rep., 591,'' it is said: "It is the duty of the court, if possible, to ascertain the legislative will, and to execute it, because the intention constitutes the law; no construction is to be indulged, that could produce absurd consequences;" and in order to ascertain what the true intention of the framers of the act is, it is a rule, that if many different interpretations present 22