Page:Hawkins v. Filkins 01.pdf/33

318Rh but, that if such was its intention, it had no power to do so.

Thus the questions are presented: If the ordinance is consistent in its provisions, and unambiguous in its language, the intention of the convention is to be ascertained, and carried into effect, according to the ordinary meaning of the language used. But if the ordinance, upon examination of its several parts, should be found inconsistent or ambiguous, we must bring to our aid several well established rules for construing contracts and laws of this character, and to which we may presently refer.

The ordinance, at the outset, affirms the right of the people to establish a constitution, "in conformity with the constitution of the United States," and "recognizing the legitimate consequences of the existing rebellion," declares the entire action of the convention of the 4th March, 1861, null and void, and never, at any time, binding upon the people. Now, it is evident, that if the word entire, in this connection, be taken in its enlarged sense, it comprehends everything done by the convention of 1861; that is, that the convention of 1861, had no power to do any thing. And if this be true, it must be because the convention had no legal existence—which we have already determined not to be the case. The convention of 1861 was a legally constituted convention of the people, with power to do all that a convention might lawfully do. Acts done in excess of power, do not vitiate, or make void those done within the scope of the powers conferred.

At this point, then, arises a question as important as it is new. That is, has one convention the power to declare void ab initio, the constitution of the state framed by a preceding convention? If this be true, and such be its effect, it necessarily follows, as a consequence, that, from the 6th of May, 1861, until the