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56 56 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. fault accord with satisfaction is a good plea."^ In other words, the breach of a covenant sounding in damages, Hke the breach of an assumpsit, seems to have been conceived of as a tort; ^ whereas a specialty debt was the grant by deed of an immediate right, which must subsist until either the deed was cancelled or there was a reconveyance by a deed of release. This continued the rule at common law until 1854, when the specialty debtor was, by statute, allowed to bar the satisfied creditor by a plea on equitable grounds; ^ for he was plainly entitled before this time to a perma- nent unconditional injunction.* Discharge of Surety. — It is a familiar doctrine of English law that a creditor, who agrees to give time to a principal debtor, thereby discharges the surety unless he expressly reserves his right against the latter. But if the surety's obligation was under seal, his only mode of resisting the creditor on the ground of such indul- gence was by applying to a Court of Equity for an injunction.^ He had no legal defence to the creditor's action.^ The rule was the same in England, and in a few of our States, where the principal and surety were co-makers of a promissory note.'^ The English statute of 1854, introducing pleas on equitable grounds, now gives the surety an equitable defence at law. And, generally, in this country the defence has been allowed to actions on notes without the aid of a statute.^ 1 Blake's Cas. 6 Rep. 43, b. 2 " And when it [the covenant] is broken, the action is not founded merely upon the specialty as if it were a duty, but savors of trespass, and therefore an accord is a good plea to it." Eeles v. Lambert, Al. 38. " But the cause of action accrues by the tort subsequent." Rabbetts v. Stoker, 2 Roll. R. 187, 188. " Covenant is executory and sounds only in damages, and a tort, which (as it seems) dies with the person," per Baldwin, J., in Anon. Dy. 14. See also Sir Frederick Pollock's "Contracts in Early English Law," 6 Harvard Law Review, 400. 350- ^ Rees V. Berrington, 2 Ves. Jr. 542. « Bulteel V. Jarrold, 8 Price, 467 ; Davey v. Prendergrass, 5 B. & Al. 187 ; Ash- bee V. Pidduck, I M. & W. 564; Parker v. Watson, 8 Ex. 404; Spriggz/. Mt. Pleasant, Bank, 10 Pet. 257; U. S. v. Howell, 4 Wash. C. C. 620; Locke v. U. S.; 3 Mass. 446; Wittmer v. Ellison, 72 111. 301 ; Tate v. Wymond, 7 Blackf. 240; Lewis v. Harbin, 5 B. Mon. 564; Pintard 2/. Davis, Spencer, 205; Shaw z/. McFarlane, i Ired. 216; Holt z/. Bodey, 18 Pa. 207 ; Dozier v. Lee, 7 Humph. 520; Burke v. Cruger, 8 Tex. 66; Step- toe V. Harvey, 7 Leigh. 501 ; Sayre v. King, 17 W. Va. 562. ^ Pooley V. Harradine, 7 E. & B. 431 ; Yates v. Donaldson, 5 Md. 389 ; Anthony V. Fritts, 45 N. J. I. 8 2 Ames, Cas. on Bills and Notes, 82 n. 2.
 * Steeds v. Steeds, 22 Q. B. D. 537. See also Savage v. Blanchard, 148 Mass. 348,
 * Webb V. Hewitt, 3 K. & J. 438.