Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/569

541 NOTES. 541 there is on this subject is unsettled. It would seem the more natural step to bring an action for violation of the contract of pledge, or to tender payment before bringing the action of trover. In the action on the con- tract, at least, an equitable defence would be allowed. The plaintiff's damages would be diminished by the amount of his debt to the defendant, the pledgee. On the precise question involved in the two cases cited there is a con- flict of opinion. In England the law is contrary to these authorities. The first English case on the subject, Johnson v. Stear, 15 C. B. n. s. 330, held that the pledgee's act was conversion, but that the amount of damages should be only the pledgor's actual loss, — that the pledgee's interest in the pledge at the time of the conversion should be taken into account. Mr. Justice Williams in an able dissenting opinion maintained that the pledgee stood in practically the same position as a factor, — that by his act the pledgor regained immediate right of possession, and was entitled to judg- ment in trover for the full value of the goods. Obviously, if there was conversion at all, full damages should have been awarded. Two later cases, Donald v. Suckling, L. R. i Q. B. 585, and Halliday v. Holgate^ L. R. 3 Ex. 299, practically overruled Jofvisoji v. Stear by holding that there was no conversion. To support this view, the court maintained that a pledge is something more than a mere bailment, aild that the pledgee, by parting with possession, does not lose his special property in the pledge. Mr. Justice Shee dissented in Donald v. Suckling on the grounds put forth by Mr. Justice Williams in the earlier case. Nevertheless, these two cases represent the English law. In the United Slates the question is still open. Some courts adopt the English view without question or hesitation. Others maintain the views adopted by Georgia and Missouri courts. The English doctrine would seem to be the less satisfactory. There is no cogent reason for holding that the pledgee gets so much more extended rights than a bare bailee that he can dispose of the article pledged without losing his lien. It would seem more natural and consistent that, apart from the privilege of pledging up to the amount of the original security, — a proceeding which in no way affects the first pledgor's position, — the pledgee should have no*more right than the factor holding his principal's goods, on which he loses his lien in parting with possession. Just as the pledgor may maintain trover for de- struction of the pledged goods by the negligence of the pledgee, so should he be allowed trover when the pledgee has repledged the goods for an amount greater than the original pledgor's indebtedness to him. Respondeat Superior in the case of Charitable Corporations. — Is the doctrine of respoiideat sicperior to be applied to charitable corpora- tions ? A resume of the judical decisions in point may start appropriately with the case of Dufican v. Findlater, 6 CI. & Fin. 894 (1839), decided on appeal from the Scotch Court of Session. The only importance of the case lies in a dictum by Lord Cottenham to the effect that the funds of a body incorporated for public purposes can never be diverted from those purposes to the payment of damages which are recovered for injuries caused by the negligence of the servants of the corporation ; and that a suit for such damages is consequently idle, and will not be entertained by the courts. This view was reaffirmed and applied to charitable corporations 71